Kahn's Escalation Ladder
Contents
Subcrisis Maneuvering
We are interested here not in day-today maneuvers that do not raise the possibility of escalation, but only in the ones that manipulate, either deliberately or otherwise, the fear of escalation or eruption. It will be one of my theses that remote as the middle and upper rungs of the escalation ladder may seem, they often cast a long shadow before them and can greatly influence events well below the violence threshold, or even below that point in a conflict when the explicit threat of violence is voiced.
- Ostensible Crisis
- Political, Economic and Diplomatic Gestures
- Solemn and Formal Declarations
At this stage, the language of crisis is used, but with some degree of pretense. Either one or both sides assert, more or less openly and explicitly but not quite believably, that unless the dispute is quickly resolved, rungs of the escalation ladder will be climbed.
Legal but inconveniencing, unfair, unfriendly, discourteous, inequitable, or threatening acts are carried out against the opponent to punish, apply pressure, or convey messages. If this becomes very hostile, these acts are called "retortions"
These are purely verbal but explicitly solemn and formal actions intended to demonstrate resolve and committal. They may be in the form of legislative resolutions, formal executive announcements, diplomatic notes, or other very explicit and obviously serious declarations. Such a resolution or proclamation may be a simple notice to other nations of one's policy in a certain geographical or other area, or it may address a conflict or dispute more directly. It may often be thought of as a pre-emptive or preventive escalation that tries to forestall escalation by the opponent.
Traditional Crises (the Boat Is Rocked)
In a thermonuclear balance of terror, both nations will be reluctant to start a crisis that could escalate, perhaps inadvertently, possibly even going beyond control and erupting into an all-out war. There is, therefore, a tendency not to let even a low-level crisis start—a constraint not to rock the nuclear boat.
- Hardening of Positions -- Confrontation of Wills
- Show of Force
- Significant Mobilization
- "Legal" Harassment -- Retortions
- Harassing Acts of Violence
- Dramatic Military Confrontations
When the situation becomes coercive rather than contractual, the antagonists often attempt to increase the credibility of their commitments by "bridge-burning" acts, a deliberate increasing of the stakes, perhaps a joining together of several issues with the deliberate purpose of making it harder for the other side to believe that one can be made to back down.
One side or the other may hint, or even make clear, that violence is "thinkable." If it does this by acts rather than words, we call it a "show of force."
The accompaniment of a show of force by a modest mobilization that not only increases one's strength but also indicates a willingness to call on more force or to accelerate the arms race if necessary.
One can harass the opponent's prestige, property, or people legally. That is to say, one may act in a very hostile and provocative manner, but within the limits of international law.
If the crisis is still not resolved, more or less illegal acts of violence or other incidents designed to harass, confuse, exhaust, violate, discredit, frighten, and otherwise harm, weaken, or demoralize the opponent or his allies and friends may be carried out through clandestine or unattributed channels, or through limited paramilitary or other overt agencies.
If there is a direct ("eyeball to eyeball") confrontation that appears to be a stark test of nerves, committal, resolve, or recklessness, all participants and observers will take an intense interest in the proceedings.
Intense Crises
Nuclear War is Unthinkable Threshold
- Provocative Breaking off of Diplomatic Relations
- Super-Ready Status
- Large Conventional War (or Actions)
- Large Compound Escalator
- Declaration of Limited Conventional War
- Barely Nuclear War
- Nuclear "Ultimatums"
- Limited Evaluations (20%)
- Spectacular Show or Demonstration of Force
- "Justifiable" Counterforce Attack
- "Peaceful" World-Wide Embargo or Blockade
During a conventional warlike act (Rung 12) or the super-ready status (Rung 11), one or more nuclear weapons may be used unintentionally (accidentally or unauthorizedly). Or one of the antagonists may make military or political use of a nuclear weapon but try to give the impression that the use was unintentional.
Whether or not there is a conventional or barely nuclear war, the crisis could enter a stage of such increased intensity that the state of nuclear incredulity would not merely be weakened but would vanish. This could occur when one side or the other seriously considered the possibility of a central war and communicated this fact convincingly to its opponent.
This would most likely be at least a quasi-official move ordered by a government for either bargaining or prudential reasons, or both. The difficulties, and possible public and political reactions, make such an evacuation a momentous decision, and one whose consequences could not reliably be predicted. I would also include at this rung serious efforts by one or both sides to prepare for both largescale evacuation and improvised protection.
A spectacular show or demonstration of force would involve using major weapons in a way that did no obvious damage, but appeared determined, menacing, or reckless. The purpose would be to punish the enemy for a previous act, or pre-emptively to punish him for an anticipated one (with the intention of establishing a precedent to deter later provocations), or to intensify the fear of war in the hope of frightening the enemy into backing down.
A "justifiable" attack would be sufficiently specialized and limited to seem a reasonable response to provocation, and yet it might significantly, or even decisively, degrade the military capability, prestige, or morale of the opponent.
This would be an extreme measure of nonviolent coercion brought to bear against an opponent. It is more escalatory than the previous rungs because of its continuing nature.
Bizarre Crises (Nuclear Weapons Are Used)
Up to this point, while nuclear incredulity would have been shattered, nuclear weapons would not have been used extensively. Even if the barely nuclear war had occurred, it presumably would have been accepted as an accident or limited episode, and even a nuclear show of force or "justifiable" counterforce attack might have been understood as a limited action rather than serious nuclear warfare. Now we move wholly into what many consider an entirely bizarre range of possibilities, the very limited and restrained use of nuclear weapons.
- Local Nuclear War -- Exemplary
- Declaration of Limited Nuclear War
- Local Nuclear War -- Military
- Unusual, Provocative and Significant Countermeasures
- Evacuation (70%)
Almost every analyst now agrees that, with the possible exception of Rung 19-type tactics, the first use of nuclear weapons—even against military targets —is likely to be less for the purpose of destroying the other side's military forces or of handicapping its operations than for redressive, warning, bargaining, punitive, fining, or deterrence purposes. As this would be the first unmistakably deliberate use of these weapons since World War II, it would be a profoundly consequential act, even if very limited and specialized.
At this point, it might be judged desirable to make a formal declaration of limited nuclear war—perhaps in hope of setting out relatively exact limits and establishing expectations about the types of nuclear action that the declarer intends to initiate and that he is prepared to countenance from the enemy without escalating further himself.
It is also possible that nuclear weapons could be used in a local situation for traditional military purposes such as defense, denial, destruction, or degradation of the opponent's capability, and so on, and that, within the established limits, the scale and targeting would be, and would be acknowledged to be, dictated by wholly military and "tactical" considerations.
One side might carry out redeployments or maneuvers that would have the effect of shifting the balance of power by increasing an opponent's vulnerability to attack or otherwise degrading its capability, morale, or will.
At this point, the situation may be very close to large-scale war. It may now seem advisable to evacuate a large number of people from cities. The total would probably amount to between two-thirds and threefourths of the population—women and children and those men who are not essential to the functioning of the cities. I would judge that all important industries, communications, transportation facilities, etc., could be operated by about a quarter of the population or less.
Exemplary Central Attacks (Violating The Central Sanctuary — Nuclear Gunboat Diplomacy)
Attacks that avoid the zone of interior of the enemy observe a salient threshold: the one dividing the categories of "homeland" and "not-homeland." To cross this threshold would open the way to large-scale violence.
- Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior
- Exemplary Attack on Military
- Exemplary Attacks Against Property
- Exemplary Attacks on Population
- Complete Evacuation (95%)
- Reciprocal Reprisals
A "harmless" attack (perhaps on an isolated mountain top or empty desert) which does dramatic and unmistakable physical damage, if only to the topography.
One side might begin destroying portions of the other side's weapons systems, but in a relatively careful way so as not to cause much collateral damage. These attacks could be launched primarily to exert psychological pressure or to reduce the defender's military capability significantly by finding leverage targets.
The next step would obviously be to increase the level of these limited strategic attacks. One possibility would be attacks on such expensive installations as bridges, dams, or gaseous diffusion plants. More damaging and dangerous would be limited attacks on cities, presumably after warning had been delivered and the cities evacuated; the purpose would be to destroy property, not people.
In any crisis of the mid-1960's, this attack would probably be much higher on the ladder than I put it here, but if the balance of terror becomes sufficiently stable, and governments are believed to be under intense and graduated mutual deterrents, even this attack could occur without an eruption to spasm or other central war.
But at this point, large-scale warfare has either begun or is imminent. If at all possible, each side is likely to evacuate its cities almost completely, leaving 5-10 per cent of the population behind for essential activities.
This is a war of almost pure resolve, with more or less continual tit-for-tat exchanges, whether limited to purely symbolic attacks or more destructive exemplary attacks. Many strategists believe that reciprocal reprisal wars— "resolve against resolve"—might be a standard tactic of the future when the balance of terror is judged, whether correctly or not, to be almost absolute or when, because of strategic invulnerability, no other choices are available to desperate or gambling decisionmakers.
Military Central Wars
Central War Threshold
- Formal Declaration of "General" War
- Slow-Motion Counter-"Property" War
- Slow-Motion Counterforce War
- Constrained Force-Reduction Salvo
- Constrained Disarming Attack
- Counterforce-with-Avoidance Attack
- Unmodified Counterforce Attack
Civilian Central Wars
City Targeting Threshold
- Slow-Motion Countercity war
- Countervalue Salvo
- Augmented Disarming Attack
- Civilian Devastation Attack
- Controlled General War
- Spasm/Insensate War
There may be situations in which striking a center of gravity might deliver a fatal blow; but the enemy might still be able to retaliate with a lethal or unacceptably damaging response, much like a spider whose legs continue to strike after it is dead. This phenomenon is what nuclear strategist Herman Kahn once referred to as “insensate war" and it is still a possibility in today’s globalized world,
